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Focus paper
Much of economic theory is based 
on the idea of rational maximising 
individuals. Suppose instead 
individuals follow simple adaptive 
learning rules. Does this result in 
the same outcomes, at least in 
the long run?  In many situations, 
the answer, perhaps surprisingly, 
is yes. Results in learning theory 
show that in many games adaptive 
learning converges to Nash 
equilibrium, the type of equilibrium 
most commonly used in studying 
strategic situations.  However, 
there is a dark side, rarely 
acknowledged, to the theory. In 
some other games learning never 
converges but rather 
continues to cycle. 
cyclical 
behaviour
Recent work by Ed Hopkins and 
coauthors specifically addresses 
instability.  While classic work by the 
Nobel prize winner Lloyd Shapley 
had first identified the possibility of 
a learning process converging to a 
persistent cycle, much subsequent 
work has merely treated this as 
an inconvenience rather than an 
opportunity. To be fair, it has not 
been clear what exactly we should 
expect to see when adaptive play 
diverges from equilibrium. Nash 
equilibrium is relatively simple and 
parsimonious, whereas cyclical 
behaviour seems both complex and 
somewhat implausible. For example, 
in the original work of Shapley, 
the prediction is a cycle of every 
increasing length around the exterior 
of what is now called a “Shapley 
polygon”. 
The first paper, “Learning in 
Games with Unstable Equilibria”, 
presents new results on cyclical 
behaviour that are simpler, more 
plausible and directly testable. The 
classical model of learning used by 
Shapley, fictitious play, is modified 
to allow for individuals placing 
greater weight on more recent 
experience, a modification inspired 
by experimental evidence.  It then 
follows that cycles in learning that 
arise when play diverges from 
equilibrium do not increase in length. 
Further, if one takes an average of 
play over time, then this average 
converges to a particular point, a 
point we label the TASP, for “Time 
Average of the Shapley Polygon”. In 
many cases the TASP is close to the 
Nash equilibrium.  In others it is quite 
distinct.
These results potentially explain 
otherwise anomalous results 
in economics experiments. For 
example, in experiments on price 
setting games conducted by Cason 
and Friedman (2003), it was found 
that on average across the whole 
experiment the prices charged on 
average were very similar to those 
predicted by Nash equilibrium.  But 
it was also found that prices followed 
clearly cyclical movements over time, 
which is not consistent with play 
being in equilibrium.   
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But both these observations are 
consistent with the new theory, 
where play follows a cycle but average 
behaviour can be close to equilibrium.
But this raises a question. If the 
TASP and Nash equilibrium can be 
mistaken for each other, is it possible 
to tell them apart? The second paper, 
“Testing the TASP: an Experimental 
Investigation of Learning in Games 
with Unstable Equilibria”, concerns 
experiments designed to test this new 
theory. Participants were randomly 
matched to play one of two 4 × 4 
games each with a unique mixed 
Nash equilibrium. In one game, the 
equilibrium is predicted to be stable 
under learning, and in the other 
unstable. Both games are versions 
of Rock–Paper–Scissors with the 
addition of a fourth strategy, Dumb. 
The mixed equilibrium in both 
games is (1, 1, 1, 3)/6: Dumb is thus 
the most frequent strategy. In the 
unstable game, however, adaptive 
learning is predicted to diverge from 
the equilibrium to a cycle, a “Shapley 
polygon”, that places no weight upon 
Dumb.  
zero. That is, we find support for the 
idea that the stability or instability 
of an equilibrium, as predicted by 
learning theory, can influence human 
behaviour. The data also reject 
Nash equilibrium, which predicts no 
difference between the treatments. 
So, the experiments do find support 
for learning theory over the static 
equilibrium predictions. However, 
the actual difference is smaller than 
the theory predicts. This is not so 
surprising in that experimental data, 
and real life, are much noisier than the 
abstract picture painted in theoretical 
models. Nonetheless, these abstract 
models do predict actual human 
behaviour in these strategic situations.
Toy games such as rock-scissors-paper 
might seem far removed from real 
economic situations. However, it is 
important to realise that they are 
analogous to many problems faced 
in market settings.  The aim in this 
experimental work is to start with a 
simple situation where there is greater 
control. We now have a much clearer 
picture of the dynamic behaviour.  
Further research already underway 
will carry out similar experiments in a 
much more realistic setting. 
This is illustrated in Figure 1.  The 
pyramid shape represents possible 
mixed strategies, with the frequency 
of the fourth strategy on the vertical.  
The Nash equilibrium (N) is in the 
interior. However, the Shapley polygon 
is the dashed triangle on the base 
of the pyramid where the fourth 
strategy has zero frequency.  The TASP 
is the average of an orbit around this 
Shapley polygon and thus must also be 
on the base of the pyramid. The TASP 
is given by point T. It is easy to see that 
the Nash equilibrium and the TASP are 
quite distinct.
Further, if adaptive learning describes 
agents’ behaviour, the limiting 
frequency of Dumb is a ready indicator 
of whether we are in the stable or 
unstable case. It is also, therefore, a 
simple way to determine whether the 
predictions of learning theory hold in 
practice. Equilibrium theory suggests 
that the frequency of Dumb should be 
the same, equal to one half, in both 
games. Learning theory suggests they 
should be quite different.
In the experiments, we find that there 
is a difference in play in the unstable 
game. The frequency of Dumb is 
lower and play is further from Nash, 
though the frequency of Dumb is 
always substantially greater than 
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Fig. 1 Nash Equilibrium (N) and TASP (T) in the unstable version of the RPSD game. The frequencies of 
strategies 1 and 2 are on the horizontal axes and of strategy 4 on the vertical axis.
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